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The Legal System and the Legitimacy of Clinical Guidelines 
 
Abstract 
Clinical guidelines have proliferated in the last twenty years, with many thousands of them being 
created by a variety of groups for a variety of purposes.  This proliferation has seen the legitimacy 
of some guidelines being called into question and have resulted in a proliferation of self-
regulatory mechanisms (meta-guidelines) that aim to regulate the processes through which 
clinical guidelines are developed and hence to provide standards against which a user can 
measure the legitimacy of a guideline.    However, clinical guidelines are also subject to forms of 
regulation by other actors, including the courts, and these actors have their own norms.  This 
paper focuses on examining the norms established by the courts when they consider whether 
clinical guidelines are legitimate.  The factors that some courts consider when assessing the 
legitimacy of guidelines are: expertise; consensus; consultation; evidence; bias and conflicts of 
interest; and compliance with relevant law.   
 
Introduction  
Clinical guidelines (this category includes guidelines, guidance, and policies and will be referred 
to subsequently as clinical guidelines) intend to guide clinical practice but are not intended by 
their authors to be binding.1  Clinical guidelines have proliferated in the last twenty years, with 
thousands of them being created by a variety of groups for a variety of purposes in what has been 
described as a pluralistic guideline environment.2  One of the central challenges facing those who 
create clinical guidelines in this context is that there has often been a limited uptake of them by 
potential users.  There are a number of reasons that may explain this but one explanation (the 
one that is most relevant to this paper) is that potential users may question the legitimacy of the 
guideline and/or the body or persons that issued it.3  Some groups and organisations, such as the 
Institute of Medicine (U.S.), the National Health and Medical Research Council (Australia) 
(NHMRC) and the World Health Organization, have issued what might be described as “meta-
guidelines” that regulate best practice processes through which clinical guidelines should be 
created.4  One expressed purpose for these meta-guidelines is to develop robust processes for 
                                                          
1 David Eddy, ‘Designing a Practice Policy: Standards, Guidelines and Options’ (1990) 263(22) Journal of the Medical 
Association 3077. 
2 Clark Havighurst, ‘Practice Standards as Legal Standards Governing Physician Liability’ (1991) 54(2) Law and 
Contemporary Problems 87; Michelle Mello, ‘Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in 
Medical Malpractice Litigation’ (2001) 149(3) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 645. 
3 Robin Graham et al (eds), Clinical Practice Guidelines We Can Trust (National Academies Press, 2011); Gordon H 
Guyatt et al, ‘GRADE: an emerging consensus on rating quality of evidence and strength of recommendations’ 
(2008) 336 BMJ 924. 
4 Institute of Medicine, Standards for Developing Trustworthy Clinical Practice Guidelines (23 March 2011) 
<http://www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/Reports/2011/Clinical-Practice-Guidelines-We-Can-
Trust/Standards.aspx>; Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, National Guideline Clearinghouse, Inclusion 
Criteria (1 June 2014) <http://www.guideline.gov/about/inclusion-criteria.aspx>; World Health Organization, 
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the formulation of clinical guidelines that address the concerns of potential users about whether 
the guideline is legitimate or not5 and/or to enable an expert body to sanction the legitimacy of 
a clinical guideline.6   
 
However, clinical guidelines are also subject to forms of regulation by other actors, including the 
courts, which have their own norms.  The courts also determine the legitimacy of clinical 
guidelines by affirming or rejecting them in the course of legal proceedings.  While there has 
been some examination in the literature of how the courts and lawyers may use clinical guidelines 
in medical malpractice litigation, especially such questions as whether and in what circumstances 
guidelines are admissible as evidence and whether they constitute the standard of care,7 no 
attention has been paid to how a court determines whether and why a clinical guideline is 
‘legitimate’.  This is an important normative question as, as Jasanoff has noted, scientific 
processes and legal proceedings: 
 
“appear as sites where society is busily constructing its ideas about what 
constitutes legitimate knowledge, who is entitled to speak for nature, and how 
much deference science should command in relation to other modes of 
knowing.”8   
 
It is also an important instrumental question, as attention to issues considered relevant by the 
courts in determining the legitimacy of a clinical guideline may be additional considerations for 
those involved in the process of creating such guidelines.   
 
This paper critically examines the norms established by courts in some common-law jurisdictions 
when they consider whether a clinical guideline is legitimate.  Accordingly, the first section of this 
paper provides an introduction to clinical guidelines and meta-guidelines.  The second section 
contains a brief discussion of law, clinical guidelines and meta-guidelines.  The third section 
examines the process related elements that courts from some common-law jurisdictions examine 
when considering whether a guideline is ‘legitimate’ in respect of the issue under consideration.  
There is limited case-law which provides much discussion on factors which judges consider go to 
                                                          
Handbook for Guideline Development (WHO, 2012); Guyatt et al, n 3; National Health and Medical Research 
Council, Procedures and Requirements for Meeting the 2011 NHMRC Standard for Clinical Practice Guidelines 
(May 2011) <https://www.nhmrc.gov.au/guidelines-publications/cp133-and-cp133a?>. 
5 Institute of Medicine, n 4. 
6 National Health and Medical Research Council, n 4; National Guideline Clearinghouse, n 4. 
7 See for example, from Australia, Ian Freckelton, ‘Clinical Practice Guidelines: Legal Repercussions’ (2002) 10:1 
Journal of Law and Medicine 5; J Tibballs, ‘Clinical Practice Guidelines in the Witness Box: Can They Replace the 
Medical Expert?’ (2007) 14(4) Journal of Law and Medicine 479; from the United Kingdom, Brian Hurwitz, ‘Legal 
and Political Considerations of Clinical Practice Guidelines’ (1999) 318 British Medical Journal 661; Ash Samanta, Jo 
Samanta, and Michael Gunn, ‘Legal Consideration of Clinical Guidelines: Will NICE Make a Difference?’ (2003) 96 
Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 133; John Tingle and Charles Foster (eds), Clinical Guidelines: Law, Policy 
and Practice (Cavendish, 2002); and from the United States, Mello, n 2; Rosoff, Arnold, ‘Evidence-Based Medicine 
and The Law: The Courts Confront Clinical Practice Guidelines’ (2001) 26(2) Journal of Health Politics, Policy and 
Law 327; Havighurst, n 2.  
8 Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar: Law, Science and Technology in America (Harvard University Press, 1995), xv. 
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the perceived legitimacy of a clinical guideline.  The most detailed analysis by the courts of factors 
going to the legitimacy of a clinical guideline unsurprisingly comes from judicial review cases, 
where the process through which guidelines were created and/or have been used is a or the 
focus of the proceedings.  The analysis of relevant cases shows that factors that are relevant for 
the courts include: expertise; consensus; consultation; evidence; bias and conflicts of interest; 
and that a clinical guideline must comply with any applicable legal requirements.     
 
Clinical Guidelines and Meta-Guidelines 
Clinical guidelines may be developed to assist in determining whether individual patients or 
groups of patients can or should access certain types of medications, devices or services or 
whether care should be provided, withdrawn or withheld.  Other clinical guidelines focus on ‘best 
practice’ in its broadest sense.  The objectives of creating clinical guidelines vary, but include the 
desire to: reduce variations in care; to promote and enable the provision of evidence based 
medicine; and to provide interventions that are both efficacious and cost-effective.9  
 
At the practice level, clinical guidelines may be developed, for example, by ad hoc groups, health 
care facilities, or professional associations or societies. The motivation to do this varies.  One key 
reason may be to integrate “individual clinical expertise with the best available external clinical 
evidence from systematic research”10 which, in theory, will help reduce variation and ensure 
consistency in clinical practices, both clinically and ethically.   
 
Government bodies, such as the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in the 
United Kingdom and Australia’s NHMRC, may also be involved in or lead processes for the 
development of clinical guidelines.  Some government bodies may have an explicit legislative 
mandate to create guidelines.  For example, in 2012 NICE’s enabling legislation gave it authority 
to develop health and medical guidance and quality standards.11 In Australia, the NHMRC’s 
enabling legislation also empowers it to formulate clinical guidelines.12  There are a variety of 
reasons for the role of government actors in this space.  In part, the motivation for the 
involvement of government agencies may mirror the motivations of health professionals: an 
interest in ensuring that health services provided to patients are of the best quality (not just in 
clinical terms but also in respect of legal, ethical and social issues); are informed by evidence; and 
minimise clinical practice variations for individuals and groups.13  In part, the motivation may also 
be attributed to concerns about cost-effectiveness to make sure that public funds are used so as 
to maximise the benefit to taxpayers.14     
 
As a result of the many actors working in this space, as Mello notes: 
 
                                                          
9 Tingle and Foster, n 7; Rosoff, n 7; Havighurst, n 2; Mello, n 2; Samanta, Samanta, and Gunn, n 7; D W Sackett et 
al, ‘Evidence based medicine: What it is and what it isn’t’ (1996) 312(7023) British Medical Association Journal 71. 
10 Sackett et al, n 9, 71. 
11 Part 8 Health and Social Care Act 2012 (UK). 
12 National Health and Medical Research Council Act 1992 (Cth) s 7. 
13 Samanta, Samanta and Gunn, n 7. 
14 Samanta, Samanta and Gunn, n 7. 
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“The overall picture of [clinical guidelines] is thus characterized by tremendous 
diversity – in the parties creating the guidelines, their motivations, the intended 
purposes of the guidelines, the type of evidence upon which the guidelines are 
based, the procedures through which the guidelines are developed, the scope of 
the guidelines …”15   
 
Meta-guidelines are, in some ways, a response to this diversity in that they seek to set standards 
for those groups who are creating clinical guidelines about how the processes through which 
guidelines should be formulated to improve their quality and hence their external legitimacy.  
 
Meta-guidelines are a mode of self-regulation of the guidelines creation process by important 
and authoritative actors within that field (e.g. the WHO, NHMRC, the IOM and the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality).  These self-regulatory meta-guidelines address many of the 
elements discussed by Mello: who should make guidelines; how conflicts of interests are or 
should be regulated; the rigour of the process through which clinical guidelines are formulated; 
and prescribing methods through which to best evaluate the evidence upon which guidelines 
should be based.  These are similar to the norms established by the courts when considering the 
legitimacy of clinical guidelines (see discussion below).  As Jasanoff notes: 
 
“Each tradition [science and law] claims an authoritative capacity to sift evidence and 
derive rational and persuasive conclusions from it.  The reliability of observers (or 
witnesses) and the credibility of their observations are of critical concern to both legal 
and scientific decision-making.”16  
 
While this observation was in the context of expert witnesses giving scientific evidence before 
the courts, it is as relevant to clinical guidelines.  The legal system is interested in establishing the 
legitimacy and validity of evidence presented to it but in the context of resolving disputes fairly 
and efficiently.17   
  
Examination of the cases which provide some discussion of factors that leads a court to 
determine that a guideline is legitimate or not does not indicate that the courts have, as yet, 
considered the processes laid out in meta-guidelines as part of their determinations. While this 
might be of interest to the courts, the final determination of legitimacy in the context in the 
context of the dispute in question would rest with the courts.   
 
The Courts and Clinical Guidelines 
There are a number of ways the courts may consider clinical guidelines.  In negligence 
proceedings clinical guidelines may be considered as part of establishing whether the standard 
                                                          
15 Mello, n 2, 653-654. 
16 Jasanoff, n 8, 8.  
17 Jasanoff, n 8. 
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of care has been breached.18  The courts (whether they apply common-law or legislative tests) 
are generally looking for expert evidence of customary practice to assist the courts to establish 
what is accepted and proper professional practice.19  Guidelines may also be considered in the 
context of judicial review proceedings, particularly of decisions to exclude individuals from 
accessing health services after the decision-maker has applied a guideline.20 A judicial review 
proceeding may be asked to examine the process through which a guideline was developed, 
including whether there was a fair process, whether relevant and/or irrelevant considerations 
were considered,21 and whether there was any bias shown in their creation or whether a 
guideline was applied appropriately.22   Clinical guidelines also may be considered in the context 
of whether the court should authorise treatment or the withholding or withdrawing of 
treatment.23  In any of these contexts the court may have to turn its mind to whether clinical 
guidelines are relevant, whether and which guidelines should be applied, and what guidelines 
the court considers to be legitimate enough to sanction.  Jasanoff has suggested that the courts 
have their own instrumental notions of objectivity which focus on the integrity of the decision-
making process or concerns about procedural unfairness.24  The courts are orientated towards 
good process due to the law’s concern for natural justice.    
 
The Courts and the Legitimacy of Clinical Guidelines 
 
The cases discussed in the following sections are from common-law jurisdictions (primarily, 
although not exclusively, England and New Zealand) and were selected on the basis that the 
courts did not merely mention a clinical guideline but explicitly or implicitly considered its 
legitimacy when making its determination.  The cases were analysed thematically. 
  
Expertise  
A key aspect of the courts’ assessment of evidence is the perceived ‘expertise’ of the person 
presenting that evidence, as the degree of expertise the person possesses goes to the legitimacy 
of their claim to present evidence before the courts and for that evidence to be respected.25 In 
Galvin v Murray Murray J of the Irish Supreme Court held that: “an expert may be defined as a 
                                                          
18 Hurwitz, n 7; Bill Madden and Janine McIlwraith, Australian Medical Liability (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2nd ed, 
2013); Freckelton, n 7; Tibballs, n 7; Samanta, Samanta, and Gunn, n 7; Tingle and Foster, n 7; Mello, n 2; Rosoff, n 
7; Havighurst, n 2. 
19  Hurwit, n 7; Madden and McIllwraith n 18; Freckelton 2002; Tibball, n 7; Samanta, Samanta, and Gunn, n 7; 
Tingle and Foster 2002; Mello, n 2; Rosoff, n 7; Havighurst, n 2. 
20 See for example Shortland v Northland District Health [1998] 1 NZLR 433; AC v Berkshire West Primary Care Trust 
[2010] EWHC 1162. 
21 See for example Eisai Limited v The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence [2007] EWHC 1941 
(Admin); Eisai Ltd, R (on the application of) v National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) [2008] 
EWCA Civ 438. 
22 See for example Shortland v Northland District Health [1998] 1 NZLR 433. 
23 Tibballs, n 7. 
24 Jasanoff n 8; Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Serviceable Truths: Science for Action in Law and Policy’ (2015) 93 Texas Law 
Review 1723. 
25  In the context of medical negligence proceedings see Hurwitz, n 7.  More generally see Ian Freckelton and Hugh 
Selby, Expert Evidence: Law, Practice, Procedure, and Advocacy (Thomson Reuters, 5th ed, 2013). 
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person whose qualifications or expertise give an added authority to opinions or statements given 
or made by him within the area of his expertise.”26 This position is common throughout the 
common-law jurisdictions.27 As such the norms of the courts would be to look at the qualifications 
and expertise of individuals who formulate guidelines to ensure that they have the required 
expertise in respect to the subject of the guideline. It is not just individuals, however, who make 
a claim to expertise. In the context of guidelines expertise may be determined both by: the 
qualifications of the persons who, as individuals, form part of the group that creates the 
guidelines; and/or the legitimacy, based on claims to expertise, of any professional organisation 
that brings individuals together to create guidelines.   
 
What can be seen from examining the case-law in this area is, in general, that the courts 
considered that colleges or associations of medical professionals were legitimate arbitrators of 
guidelines.  Mello has noted that guidelines developed by professional medical societies may be 
regarded as highly authoritative due to the expertise of those involved in creating the 
guidelines.28  In Re C (a minor) (medical treatment)29 the British High Court considered whether 
ventilation could be withdrawn from an 18 month old severely disabled and terminally ill child, 
despite parental refusal of consent.  The High Court noted, in reference to a guideline on 
withholding and withdrawing treatment in children issued by the Royal College of Paediatrics and 
Child Health, that it was clear “that what is being proposed by the [treating] doctors has the 
support of [the College] who considered the wide field of these matters in their meetings which 
led to the publication of that document.”30  As such the legitimacy of the guideline in the eyes of 
the court was, in part, derived from the status of the Royal College and part from the process of 
consensus between its qualified members that resulted in the creation of the guidelines 
(discussed below).  A similar view in respect of expertise and professional organisations can be 
seen in the judgement of Lord Goff in the Bland case.31 In that case the United Kingdom’s House 
of Lords considered the discontinuation of artificial hydration and nutrition for a patient who had 
been in a persistent vegetative state since the Hillsborough disaster.  In regard to guidelines 
produced by the medical ethics committee of the British Medical Association (BMA), Lord Goff 
stated: “If a doctor … acts in accordance with the medical practice now being evolved by the 
Medical Ethics Committee of the BMA, he will be acting with the benefit of guidance from a 
responsible and competent body of relevant professional opinion.”32 While these cases come 
from pre-Bolitho courts in the United Kingdom, it appears likely that courts in other common-law 
jurisdictions may have similar views.   
 
Consensus 
                                                          
26 [2001] 1 ILRM 234, 239. 
27 In Canada see Rice v Sockett (1912) 8 DLR 84; in South Africa Mahomed v Shaik (1978) 4 SA 523; in Australia Sch 
1 Federal Court Rules 2011; more generally see Freckelton and Selby, n 25. 
28 Mello, n 2. See also Samanta, Samanta and Gunn, n 7, 135, “Courts at all levels are willing to accept that national 
and authoritative guidelines reflect not only responsible but also reasonable medical practice.” 
29 [1998] Lloyds Rep Med 1. 
30 [1998] Lloyds Rep Med 1, 6. 
31 Airedale National Health Service Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821. 
32 Airedale National Health Service Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821, 872. 
8 
 
One component of the process through which guidelines are formulated is the idea of consensus. 
Consensus is seen as a process through which a specific community of interest reaches broad 
agreement.  Community of interest has traditionally been defined narrowly both more generally 
within science but also within the biomedical sciences - a claim to hegemony.  While this 
exclusivity and expertise dominant modality can still be seen in the creation of some guidelines 
which remain the domain of ‘experts’, there has also been a trend towards the democratization 
of consensus.33  This can be seen in two ways: through the involvement of multi-disciplinary 
‘expertise’ (bioethicists, lawyers etc); and with attention being paid to engaged participation, for 
example, by interest groups, such as those representing patients or carers.    
 
In the context of discussing the legal system’s interaction with science, Jasanoff emphasises the 
importance of consensus.34  She suggests that in arguing that the legal system should defer to 
scientific authority the second strongest ground (after objectivity, discussed below) upon which 
science can base its argument is a claim to consensus as it implies that a disparate community 
has worked past any internal disagreements it might have to come to a collective agreement on 
a particular position.  Jasanoff connects consensus with legitimacy noting that:  
 
“If most or all members of the relevant thought collective are in agreement, 
then that collective judgment surely demands a high degree of respect from 
society in general and the law more particularly.”35   
 
Jasanoff suggests: 
 
‘The authority of scientific claims derives, according to the sociological account, not 
directly, from the representation of physical reality, but indirectly, from the certification 
of claims through a multitude of informal, often invisible, negotiations among members 
of relevant disciplines. A complex network of people, methodologies, visual records or 
inscriptions, and instruments (which themselves incorporate social conventions), must be 
brought into harmony in order to establish scientific claims as true.36  
 
Analysis of court cases examining clinical guidelines does appear to show that there is a general 
acceptance by the courts of the idea that consensus assists in conferring legitimacy. It is also 
important to note, however, that for the courts the consensus does not have to be absolute.37   
 
                                                          
33 C Holmes et al, ‘Standardization and Omics Science: Technical and Social Dimensions Are Inseparable and 
Demand Symmetrical Study’ (2010) 14(3) Omics: A Journal of Integrative Biology 327. 
34 Jasanoff, n 8. 
35 Jasanoff, n 8, 1741. 
36 Jasanoff, n 8, 52. 
37 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582; Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-
General [1993] 1 NZLR 235; Rogers v Whitaker (1992) HCA 58; 175 CLR 479; Rosenberg v Percival [2001] HCA 18; 
(2001) 205 CLR 434; Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1997] 4 All ER 771; ter Neuzen v Korn [1995] 3 
SCR 674. 
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In Early v Newham Health Authority38 Justice Bennett of the British High Court examined the 
process where a health authority had developed an internal (oral initially and then written) 
guideline in respect of failed intubations of patients in the context of a negligence proceeding.  
Justice Bennett noted that the proposed procedure for failed intubations was put before the 
division of anaesthesia at the hospital with all the consultant doctors and several others present.  
It was discussed, consensus was reached that it was the proper procedure, and the discussion 
was minuted.  Consensus amongst the relevant qualified persons was the key issue in the Judge 
determining that the guideline was “competent and reasonable.”39 
 
Similarly, consensus was deemed important in a New Zealand case, but this saw the Court 
implicitly acknowledging the desirability of the democratization of consensus, especially when 
the guideline in question raised ethical and moral questions.  In Shortland v Northland Area 
Health Limited40 the New Zealand Court of Appeal considered a judicial review application in 
respect of the decision-making process employed by Northland Health Authority (NHA) which 
saw it applying its Guidelines for Entry into the Northern Region’s End Stage Renal Failure 
Programme (the NHA Guideline) to deny Rau Williams access to renal dialysis.  New Zealand’s 
Court of Appeal noted specifically that the NHA Guidelines were developed by a committee which 
included doctors, health managers from the NHA, medical ethicists, lawyers, patient group 
representatives, nurses and iwi (representatives of the indigenous community).  Further evidence 
was presented that the NHA guidelines were discussed with renal physicians across the country, 
who supported the NHA Guidelines as being in accordance with their practices. In this case then 
the court considered two forms of consensus as contributing to the legitimacy of the NHA 
Guidelines.  First, the court, as per tradition, examined the consensus within the relevant part of 
the medical profession i.e. renal physicians as actors who have recognised expertise in the area 
of renal dialysis.  Second, the Court of Appeal also, however, recognised that the NHA Guideline 
did not merely raise clinical issues but also raised significant ethical, moral and social issues.  As 
a consequence the implicit message from the court was that a broader consensus, which included 
non-medical academic and professional expertise (such as ethicists and lawyers) and lay and 
cultural expertise (such as patients and indigenous peoples), was required for the NHA Guideline 
to be perceived as legitimate.  
 
Jasanoff has argued that it is tempting for the court to take evidence of consensus as a given and 
refrain from further action.41  This is based on an assumption that a consensus of what 
Braithwaite describes as ‘virtuous actors’42 results in guidelines that are responsible and 
reflective.  As Mello notes some of the legitimacy of guidelines developed by professional 
associations and the legitimacy of the professional associations themselves are based on 
knowledge that health professionals, and correspondingly their professional associations, have 
an ethical imperative to provide good care.43  Translated to the guidelines context this would 
                                                          
38 [1994] 5 Med LR 214. 
39 [1994] 5 Med LR 214, 216. 
40 [1998] 1 NZLR 433. 
41 Jasanoff, n 24. 
42 John Braithwaite, ‘Rewards and Regulation’ (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 12. 
43 Mello, n 2. 
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suggest that those health professionals and professional associations associated with the 
production of clinical guidelines have a moral and ethical commitment to create guidelines based 
on the best available evidence and a broad consensus that the recommended actions results in 
the most optimal outcomes for patients.44 As such, the starting point for a court would be to 
assume the responsibility and virtuosity of health professionals and professional associations.  
Generally speaking this assumption is sound.  Most professional associations and their members 
are well-intentioned and mindful of their ethical obligations. But while apparent consensus might 
dilute the need to closely examine scientific claims (in respect of this article, clinical guidelines) 
she argues that it is no excuse for the court to “abdicate its normative responsibilities”45 as the 
process involves participants making value choices.  In respect of the case of Re C (a minor) 
(medical treatment) (discussed above), at least one commentator expressed caution about the 
legitimisation by the court of the particular clinical guidelines referred to in that case, based on 
their representing a consensus.46  Kennedy argued that they had not “received general approval 
within the profession”, noting in particular criticism by the British Medical Association.47 Kennedy 
was essentially critiquing the relatively uncritical acceptance of that specific guideline by the 
court suggesting that the consensus noted by the court as a factor supporting the legitimacy of 
that guideline was more apparent than real.    
 
Consensus of expertise was something that the courts looked for in establishing the legitimacy 
of guidelines.  Expertise was in the traditional sense of what do the acknowledged experts, i.e. 
the doctors, other health professionals and professional associations, say as to what is 
acceptable.  The courts also imported a broader meaning implicitly acknowledging that, 
especially where the guidelines contains overtly ethical or moral questions, a broader consensus 
may be required drawing on other types of expertise (e.g. patient or carer groups).    
 
Consultation 
Sending draft guidelines out for review to engage key stakeholders in the process was recognised 
by some courts as an important aspect of ensuring that guidelines may be perceived by the courts 
as being legitimate.  In Shortland v Northland Health48 the New Zealand Court of Appeal noted 
that the process of formulating the NHA Guideline involved a number of stakeholders, took 18 
months of deliberations, drafts had been disseminated to appropriate parties, and the proposed 
guidelines had been discussed with renal physicians throughout the country.  The Court of Appeal 
implicitly approved the deliberative and considered nature of the process, the guideline 
development group’s engagement with stakeholders, and the frequency of  its consultation with 
a broader group though its distribution of drafts. In short the Court implicitly approved of this as 
‘good’ process and hence legitimate.   
 
                                                          
44 See also Rothman et al ‘Professional Medical Associations and their Relationships with Industry: A Proposal for 
Controlling Conflicts of Interest’ (2009) 301(13) JAMA 1367. 
45 Jasanoff, n 24, 1742. 
46 [1998] Lloyds Rep Med 1 27. 
47 I Kennedy, ‘Child: Terminal Illness; Withdrawal of Treatment Re C (a minor) (medical treatment)’ (1998) 6 
Medical Law Review 99, 101. 
48 [1998] 1 NZLR 433. 
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Similarly, AC v Berkshire West Primary Care Trust49 involved the British High Court considering a 
judicial review application from a transsexual who had been denied publically funded breast 
augmentation surgery by the Trust.  The Priorities Support Unit (PSU), which was a directorate of 
the Public Health Resource Unit (a non-profit National Health Service Consultancy Body), 
provided independent evidence-based advice to the Trust about clinical efficacy and cost-
effectiveness of treatments, in this case on the treatment of gender dysphoria. The intervenor, 
the Equality and Human Rights Commission, argued that this review of the evidence 
commissioned by the Trust from the PSU was inadequate as it did not seek to ascertain the 
professional opinions of experts in the in the field of treatment of those with gender dysphoria.  
However, the PSU’s evidence synthesis was sent out by the Trust to ‘interested bodies and 
doctors for consultation’50, including the Gender Identity Research and Education Society.  The 
Court of Appeal noted that such experts did in fact have an opportunity to present their views to 
the Trust, if not to the researchers, as part of the consultation process.  The Court implicitly 
approved of the process of consultation that occurred with what appears, from the limited 
discussion in the judgement, to be a broad range of stakeholders before the policy was finalised 
and again it was implicit that the quality of the process (i.e. consultation with a wide range of 
stakeholders) contributed to the legitimacy of the guideline.   
 
Process related issues were also subject to scrutiny in Eisai Limited v The National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence51  and Eisai Ltd, R (on the application of) v National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE)52 where Eisai Limited brought judicial review proceedings in 
the High Court in respect of guidance issued by NICE.  The guidance was in relation to the use of 
AChEIs (Inhibitors) drugs to treat Alzheimer's Disease.  Both the High Court and the Court of 
Appeal examined the processes through which the guidance on dementia drugs was formulated 
which involved extensive and multiple rounds of consultation with a variety of organisations who 
might have an interest in the outcome, including patient and carer groups, bodies representing 
healthcare professionals, manufacturers and research groups.53  Lord Justice Richards of the 
Court of Appeal noted with approval “the process of appraisal was exceptionally detailed and 
elaborate, involving extensive consultation and a high degree of disclosure at all relevant stages.  
This reflects NICE’s fundamental (and highly commendable) philosophy towards the discharge of 
its functions”.54   
 
But consultation may also raise issues in respect of the conflict of interest posed by 
commercialisation and its potential impact on guidelines.  In the Eisai cases55 the claimant, Eisai 
Limited, was a pharmaceutical company and one of the intervenors was another, Shire 
                                                          
49 [2010] EWHC 1162. 
50 [2010] EWHC 1162 [12].  
51 [2007] EWHC 1941 (Admin). 
52 [2008] EWCA Civ 438. 
53 Eisai Limited v The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence [2007] EWHC 1941 (Admin) [12]. 
54 Eisai Ltd, R (on the application of) v National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) [2008] EWCA Civ 
438 [11]. 
55 Eisai Limited v The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence [2007] EWHC 1941 (Admin) and Eisai Ltd, 
R (on the application of) v National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) [2008] EWCA Civ 438. 
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Pharmaceuticals Limited.  The NICE guidance that was in question in this case stated that, on the 
basis of a cost-effectiveness assessment, dementia drugs should only be prescribed to patients 
with moderately-severe (as opposed to mild) Alzheimer’s disease. Both companies sold these 
drugs and one can see that they had a commercial interest in challenging the process through 
which NICE developed its guidance as it limited their market. While the High Court noted this 
concern stating: “It would have been inappropriate to send the [economic] model to any of the 
pharmaceutical companies for peer review since they had an interest in the outcome of the 
process …”56, the Court of Appeal subsequently required the release of the model to the 
pharmaceutical companies as a matter of procedural fairness given that the modelling was 
central the guidance document.57 This shows the tension between the impact of conflicts of 
interest on the formulation of clinical guidelines and the law’s inherent interest in fair process 
through meaningful consultation in terms of the process through which guidelines are 
formulated.  The courts in these cases focused on consultation as an important factor going 
towards the legitimacy of the resulting guidance. 
 
Evidence 
Jasanoff argues that the strongest claim made by science for demanding deference from external 
actors, such as the courts, is science’s claim to objectivity.58  The methods used to evaluate 
evidence create objective knowledge: a claim that the evidence generated by the process can be 
absolutely relied upon by all, irrespective of their interests and correspondingly any 
disagreement is biased or distorted.59  Merton’s seminal work60 did not specifically consider the 
question of objectivity, but to quote Jasanoff he believed that: 
 
Non-objective scientific findings would get weeded out through shared findings, demands 
for universal validity, and responsible peer review. Science’s institutional need for 
certifiably reliable knowledge would ensure that these processes would function 
effectively to produce a science largely untainted by subjective bias.61  
 
While science claims objectivity, in general these claims to objectivity are viewed by many as a 
construct, albeit a powerful one.62  Having said that, the construct reinforces norms; norms that 
aim to address concerns about subjectivity and its potential negative impact on scientific 
certainty.  Those norms demand robust, contestable and reproducible processes, including in 
relation to the construction of evidence of best practice.    
                                                          
56 Eisai Limited v The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence [2007] EWHC 1941 (Admin) [60]. 
57 Eisai Ltd, R (on the application of) v National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) [2008] EWCA Civ 
438. 
58 Jasanoff, n 24. 
59 F Padovani, A Richardson, J Tsou (eds) Objectivity in Science: New perspectives from Science and Technology 
Studies (Springer, 2015);  Jasanoff, n 24; H Longino, Science as Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific 
Inquiry (Princeton University Press, 1990); D Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism 
and the Privilege of Partial Perspective’ (1988) 14:3 Feminist Studies 575. 
60 R Merton, ‘The Normative Structure of Science’ in N Storer (ed) The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and 
Empirical Investigations (University of Chicago Press, 1973) 
61 Jasanoff, n 24, 1738. 
62 Jasanoff, n 24. 
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One of the matters that any consensus of experts must determine is methodological: what 
methods will the group employ to evaluate the evidence upon which their consensus is based?  
It has long been acknowledged that there is a hierarchy between systems of evidence, for 
example, that randomised, double blinded trials (which have been subjected to rigorous peer 
review) are better than expert opinion.63  But it is also well known that some aspects of health 
care have been under researched and there may be little or no evidence about a particular 
intervention.  There may also be questions about the validity of the research for example, the 
size of the study or the way in which the study was controlled.  How is the balance between 
evidence derived from research and practitioners’ experiences in clinical practice negotiated?  
How is clinical evidence evaluated? In other words is it valid? The concerns about the legitimacy 
and validity of guidelines have been pithily summarised by Kadzielski, Weingarten and Schroder 
who noted: “There exist good guidelines which are valid and have potential use, as well as bad 
guidelines which may be equated with ‘junk science.’”64  
 
Just as the sciences focus on claims to objectivity as a basis for legitimacy, the legal system also 
makes claims to objectivity in the context of claims it impartially and rationally reviews evidence.  
The courts have always had a role in adjudicating the admissibility and weight of the evidence 
presented to them.65  This adjudication is increasingly focused on reliability and validity of the 
evidence as well as its relevance.66  Mello has suggested, in the US context, that the courts will 
now “require proof that … the guidelines were developed through a process characterized by 
scientific rigor … ”.67  As such, the methodology used to aggregate evidence will need to be clear, 
rigorous, rational and accurate. 
  
Relevant evidence considered 
As a starting point relevant clinical evidence actually needs to be examined and explicitly 
considered.  In R v North West Lancashire Health Authority ex parte A the Trust created a policy 
that effectively denied public funding in that region for gender reassignment surgery.  The author 
of that policy doubted the accuracy of the medical literature indicating a success rate of nearly 
88% in gender reassignment surgery (male to female) noting the absence of randomised 
controlled trials (the gold standard) and therefore the possibility of bias by the authors of medical 
literature in this area.  The British Court of Appeal stated in regard to decisions made by the public 
body: 
 
                                                          
63 Cambrosio et al, ‘Regulatory Objectivity and the Generation and Management of Evidence in Medicine’ (2006) 
63(1) Social Science & Medicine 189; Cambrosio et al, ‘Biomedical Conventions and Regulatory Objectivity: A Few 
Introductory Remarks’ (2009) 39(5) Social Studies of Science 651. 
64 M Kadzielski, S Weingarten, and G Schroder, ‘Peer Reviewed and Practice Guidelines Under Health Care Reform’ 
(1995) 16 Whittier L Rev 157, 161. 
65 Jasanoff, n 8; Mello, n 2; F Zweig and H Witte, ‘Assisting Judges in Screening Medical Practice Guidelines for 
Health Litigation’ (1993) 19(8) Joint Commission Journal of Quality Improvement 342. 
66 Zweig and Witte, n 65. 
67 Mello n 2, 702. 
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“the court’s only role is to require such decisions are taken in accordance with equally 
well known principles of public law.  Those principles include a requirement that the 
decisions are rationally based upon a proper consideration of the facts.  The more 
important the interest of the citizen that the decision affects, the greater will be the 
degree of consideration that is required of the decision-maker.” 68   
 
In respect of the guideline that was at issue in this case, Lord Justice Buxton stated that it was 
not rational to determine that gender reassignment surgery had no proven clinical benefit in the 
face of some evidence to suggest it did without providing a rational (and evidence based) account 
of the reasoning behind dismissing that research (this is discussed further in the evidence section 
below).    
 
The courts have also considered what evidence may be considered to be relevant or irrelevant 
to the formulation of some types of guidelines. AC v Berkshire West Primary Care Trust69 the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (which was an intervenor in the case) argued that the 
researchers from the PSU did not seek evidence from transgender women or others as to their 
psychological perception about their need for breast augmentation.  Nor did the researchers 
from the PSU seek any attitudinal research to support or rebut the proposition that breast 
augmentation has any different psychological importance for a transgender woman as compared 
to a natal woman.  The Commission stated that the researchers only looked at the published 
evidence.  This was evidence that presumably was peer-reviewed giving at least a qualified 
assurance of validity.70 Some groups seeking to develop guidelines do limit their evaluation to 
published peer reviewed evidence.  Others seek to integrate the published evidence with 
evidence from relevant experts as to customary care and from patients as to patient experience. 
The Court noted:  
 
As to seeking evidence from individual patients as to "their psychological perception of 
their need for breast augmentation", I cannot see that the Defendants were under any 
duty in law to conduct such research. On the contrary, it would no doubt have raised false 
hopes and expectations …. . I also accept the Defendants' argument that the extent of 
research required by a [Trust] into treatment for a small sub-group of patients in their 
area cannot be the same as that which NICE could reasonably be expected to carry out 
when formulating a policy, applicable nationally, for the funding of drugs to treat 
dementia.71  
 
                                                          
68 [2000] 1 WLR 977 at 997 per Buxton LJ.  
69  AC v Berkshire West Primary Care Trust [2010] EWHC 1162. 
70 Although in the U.S. in the context of new scientific techniques no less an authority than the Supreme Court has 
suggested that peer review is not a definitive determination that research is valid: Daubert v Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Jasanoff, n 8. Freckelton and Selby have suggested that courts in Britain, 
Canada and Australasia have not yet definitively settled the criteria for admitting or rejecting evidence of new 
scientific techniques or theories. Ian Freckelton and Hugh Selby, Expert Evidence: Law, Practice, Procedure, and 
Advocacy (Thomson Reuters, 5th ed, 2013). 
71 AC v Berkshire West Primary Care Trust [2010] EWHC 1162 [49]. 
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The Court essentially seems to have adopted a pragmatic view that those involved in the 
preparation of facility based guidelines could limit their evaluation to the evidence that was 
reasonably available to them, implying that a national guideline body, such as NICE, may need to 
examine the views of the patient group and of individuals more closely as it guidance would have 
broader effect. 
 
Authority of evidence 
The courts appear to value objective evidence over subjective.  In respect of guidance on 
dementia drugs, NICE did in fact seek the testimony of thousands of carers as to the impact of 
dementia drugs on them and on their loved ones.  In the Eisai case Justice Dobbs of the High 
Court stated: “the fact that thousands of carers gave testament as to the beneficial effect to them 
[dementia medication] does not of itself provide a scientific basis for allocating a calculation [for 
economic modelling].”72 In doing this it appears that Justice Dobbs was noting the limitations of 
this type of subjective evidence in respect of an ‘objective’ modelling process.  It has been 
suggested that the courts sometimes privilege certain types of evidence over another, for 
example, the courts have privileged evidence as to customary practice of doctors in negligence 
cases which is also may be somewhat subjective in its nature but which is connected to 
expertise.73  It is not clear in this case, nor in respect of the AC case,74 whether the courts were 
in fact privileging the evidence of experts over the lived experience of patients or carers.  But 
given the court’s traditional deference to claims to professional expertise and claims to 
objectivity it is certainly possible.      
 
Rigour of assessment of evidence 
The courts agreed that the evidence also needs to be rigorously assessed.  In Eisai Limited v The 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence75 the British High Court was asked to consider 
whether aspects of the methodology adopted by NICE to undertake a cost-effectiveness 
assessment of dementia were irrational in the sense of “there is an error of reasoning which robs 
the decision of logic”.76  One part of the claim was that in formulating the guidance NICE 
irrationally relied on a flawed study. This required the High Court to undertake a detailed review 
of how those involved in developing the guidance actually dealt with the flawed study: how they 
analysed it and what weight they placed upon it. Justice Dobbs concluded: “in my judgement, the 
explanation given [by NICE] was not unreasonable.  There was not unqualified acceptance of the 
study; its drawbacks were acknowledged; and in the overall scheme, the study was given reduced 
weight.”77  Hence, in the view of Justice Dobbs the matter was addressed rationally and rigorously 
by NICE.   
 
The courts also must consider the issue of the hierarchy of evidence and its role in the 
formulation of clinical guidelines.  Although randomised controlled trials are considered to be the 
                                                          
72 Eisai Limited v The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence [2007] EWHC 1941 (Admin) [131]. 
73 Hurwitz, n 7. 
74 AC v Berkshire West Primary Care Trust [2010] EWHC 1162. 
75  Eisai Limited v The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence [2007] EWHC 1941 (Admin). 
76  R v Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, ex p Balchin [1996] EWHC 152 (Admin) [27]. 
77  Eisai Limited v The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence [2007] EWHC 1941 (Admin), [122]. 
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gold standard in research,78 there are situations where they may not be ethically appropriate 
because of harms associated with no treatment or ineffective treatment for the control arm.  In 
R v North West Lancashire Health Authority ex parte A79 the author of the policy effectively 
denying public funding in that region for gender reassignment surgery noted the absence of 
randomised controlled trials (the gold standard in terms of medical evidence).80  In an obiter 
comment Lord Justice Buxton of the British Court of Appeal noted “that it is unreal to submit that 
body of opinion to research trials of the type envisaged in the health authority’s paper”81 (which 
would appear to have been gender reassignment surgery versus a control arm of counselling to 
reconcile people to their gender).  Evidence was led by some experts that such counselling would 
constitute professional negligence and that surgery was the only suitable and effective 
treatment.  Lord Justice Buxton would appear to suggest that when formulating guidelines regard 
should be had to the best available evidence but there needs to be critical and informed 
reflection on what is the best in the particular circumstances, rather than uncritically assuming 
that randomised controlled trials are essential.      
 
In summary the evidence related factors that appear to be of interest to the courts were: that 
those who formulated guidelines considered relevant evidence; the authority of that evidence 
(objective versus subjective); and the rigor of the process through which the evidence that 
informed the guideline was assessed. 
 
Bias and conflicts of interest 
The corporatisation of medicine and health care has raised questions about potential biases both 
in the creation of evidence through the research process82 and in the creation of standards and 
guidelines.83 Research is increasingly heavily funded by pharmaceutical and medical device 
companies with resulting concerns, for example, about suppression of research, research results 
which are skewed in favour of the interests of commercial sponsors and ghostwriting.84 Litigation 
in the United States has shown the extent of marketing and funding directed by pharmaceutical 
companies to doctors to induce them to prescribe their products.  For example, Johnson & 
Johnson in 2013 agreed to pay a fine of $2.2 billion dollars (US) for, amongst other things, 
payment of ‘kickbacks’ to physicians.85 It was this presumption, that such inducements create 
                                                          
78 See NHMRC, n 4.  
79  [2000] 1 WLR 977. 
80 Guyatt et al, n 3; Ted Kaptchuk, ‘The Double-Blind, Randomized, Placebo-Controlled Trial: Gold Standard or 
Golden Calf’ (2001) 54(6) Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 541.   
81  [2000] 1 WLR 977, 997.    
82 For example S Krimsky, Science in the Private Interest: Has the Lure of Profits Corrupted Biomedical Research? 
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003); Lewis et al, ‘Dancing with the Porcupine: Rules for Governing the Industry 
University Relationship’ (2001) 165(6) Canadian Medical Association Journal 783; John D Ayres, ‘1993 Le Tourneau 
Award: The Use and Abuse of Medical Practice Guidelines’ (1994) 15(3) Journal of Legal Medicine 421. 
83 Ayres, n 82; Mello, n 2. 
84 D Healy, Let Them Eat Prozac: The Unhealthy Relationship between the Pharmaceutical Industry and Depression 
(New York University Press, 2004); Lewis et al, n 82. 
85 Department of Justice, Johnson & Johnson to Pay More Than $2.2 Billion to Resolve Criminal and Civil 
Investigations (4 November 2013) <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/johnson-johnson-pay-more-22-billion-resolve-
criminal-and-civil-investigations>. 
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conflict of interest, which in the United States led to the passing of the Physician Payments 
Sunshine Act 2010 (US) which requires the public declaration of such gifts.   
 
Some have expressed concern that conflicts of interest caused by inducements or funding, 
whether in respect of clinical practice or research, may be an issue when clinical guidelines are 
formulated.86  Rothman et al noted the influence practice guidelines may have on clinical practice 
and health funding and therefore that pharmaceutical and medical device companies have a 
vested interest in the formulation of guidelines.87 The empirical evidence appears to suggest that 
persons involved in formulating guidelines frequently have financial conflicts of interest and 
there are suggestions that this may play a role in shaping the clinical guidelines.88  If inducements 
or funding from commercial companies result in individual scientists or health professionals who 
are engaged in the formulation of guidelines promoting, directly or indirectly, consciously or 
unconsciously, the interests of such companies this could compromise perceptions about the 
legitimacy of the guidelines and of the professional bodies who sponsor them.  The meta-
guidelines as a consequence focus on declaring and managing overt (financial) conflicts of 
interests.89  Rothman et al have recommended professional associations take precautions to 
safeguard against the possibility that the integrity of clinical guidelines could be compromised by 
such conflicts of interest and argue that a mere declaration of interests is not sufficient to 
safeguard the integrity of the process.90 It is also important to note that sometimes the 
professional associations sponsoring the formulation of guidelines receive funding from 
commercial companies.91         
 
External inducements are not the only way in which there is the potential for conflicts of interest 
to compromise the development of guidelines.  This is acknowledged in the IOM meta-guidelines 
which suggest that clinicians must also disclose whether substantial proportions of their income 
come from activities on which the guideline is focused. The IOM recognises that economic self-
interest could also result in biases being incorporated into guidelines, noting some evidence 
suggesting that clinicians have a lower threshold to recommend procedures they perform.92  If 
the guideline is being created in a country where the system of health care sees a doctor receive 
                                                          
86 Rothman et al, n 44; Mello, n 2; S Timmermans and S Epstein, ‘A World of Standards but not a Standard World: 
Toward a Sociology of Standards and Standardization’ (2010) 36 Annual Review of Sociology 69. 
87 Rothman et al, n 44. 
88 For example, S Norris et al, ‘Author’s Speciality and Conflicts of Interest Contribute to Conflicting Guidelines for 
Screening Mammography’ (2012) 65 Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 725; N Choudhry, H Stelfox, and A Detsky, 
‘Relationships between Authors of Clinical Practice Guidelines and the Pharmaceutical Industry’ (2002) 287 JAMA 
612; L Cosgrove et al, ‘Conflicts of Interest and Disclosure in the American Psychiatric Association’s Clinical Practice 
guidelines’ (2009) 78 Psychotherapy Psychosomatics 228; G Papanikolaou et al, ‘Reporting of Conflict of Interest in 
Guidelines of Preventative and Therapeutic Interventions’ (2001) 1 BMC Medical Research Methodology 3; 
L Johnson and R Stricker, ‘Attorney-General Forces Infectious Diseases Society of America to Redo Lyme Guidelines 
Due to Flawed Development Process” (2009) 35 Journal of Medical Ethics 283; P Hietanen, ‘Does the Expert Panel 
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89 Institute of Medicine, n 4; WHO, n 4; NHMRC, n 4. 
90 Rothman et al, n 44. 
91 Institute of Medicine, n 4. 
92 Ayres, n 82. 
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a fee for service payment for particular treatments or diagnosis there appears to be an inherent 
conflict of interest in asking members of that speciality to develop guidelines in respect of best 
practice.  If a guideline recommends, for example, that people are universally screened for a 
particular form of cancer from age thirty instead of age forty, the relevant profession may 
experience an economic windfall, after all they generally have a monopoly in providing such 
services.  Economic self-interest as a driver for medical practice decisions is (sadly) not unknown.  
For example, the Australian Commonwealth government amended its Health Insurance Act 1973 
(Cth) (the act that established its Medicare system) to address concerns that pathologists and 
radiologists were providing inducements to doctors for referrals.93  But meta-guidelines also note 
that it is difficult to exclude all persons with the requisite expertise and thus a professional 
interest from guidelines development groups, as any resultant guidelines may not be seen by 
users to be legitimate.94    
 
One of the challenges facing the courts if they need to determine whether guidelines are 
legitimate will be to examine the integrity of the individuals and organisations who formulated 
the guidelines.  In general the assumption that underlies the relatively uncritical acceptance by 
the courts of guidelines issued by professional bodies appears to be that professional bodies and 
the professionals who contribute to the formulation of standards and guidelines are to again 
quote Braithwaite ‘virtuous actors’.95  However, the legal system has had good reason to call into 
question the actions of some health professionals due to concerns about conflicts of interest.  In 
respect of expert witnesses some have suggested that there are no neutral experts as their 
expertise is paid for by the respective parties to litigation and as such they have a vested interest 
in providing a particular interpretation of evidence.96  An example is the effort by the tobacco 
companies to use experts to subvert compelling evidence that tobacco caused cancer.97  
 
In the guidelines context, such conflicts can also be seen.  In 2006, the U.S. State of Connecticut’s 
Attorney-General commenced an antitrust investigation into the development by the Infectious 
Diseases Society of America (ISDA) of Lyme Disease Treatment Guidelines.98 The guideline 
narrowed the definition of Lyme disease so as to exclude most persons with Lyme disease from 
treatment.  It was alleged that when the ISDA revised the guidelines it only allowed the 
participation of experts who were known to be biased against the diagnosis and treatment of 
Lyme disease, who had commercial interests in respect of Lyme vaccines or diagnostic tools or 
provided expert evidence in favour of vaccine companies, and who ignored evidence inconsistent 
with their views.  The ISDA refused to allow patients and treating doctors’ representation on the 
Guidelines panel.99  The ISDA had effective monopoly powers as it could require its members to 
                                                          
93 See Part IIA, IIBA Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth); Fiona McDonald, ‘The Regulation of Health Professionals’ in B 
White, F McDonald and L Willmott (eds), Health Law in Australia (Thomson Reuters, 2nd ed, 2014) 611.. 
94 Institute of Medicine, n 4. 
95 Braithwaite, n 42. 
96 M Hagen, Whores of the Court (Regan Books, 1997); Freckelton, Ian, ‘Medical Evidence’ in Freckelton and Selby, 
n 25; Jasanoff, n 24. 
97 Jasanoff, n 24. 
98 Johnson and Stricker, n 88. 
99 Johnson and Stricker, n 88. 
19 
 
comply with the guidelines by providing expert evidence in disciplinary proceedings against non-
compliant doctors and had gatekeeping functions in respect of journals, conferences, and ground 
rounds.  As such an antitrust investigation could examine the alleged misuse of ISDA’s monopoly 
when it did not ensure that the guideline development was fair, inclusive of competing 
perspectives and evidence, and not biased by commercial interests. After an investigation, the 
case was settled before trial.  The terms of the settlement were that the ISDA had to reconvene 
the panel with entirely new panel members who were free of conflicts of interest to reconsider 
the recommendations in the guideline, a process to be chaired by a bioethicist.  It also had to 
hold a public hearing.100   Conflicts of interests that influence the direction of guidelines and which 
have implications for patients are a very real concern and go towards whether the public and, 
importantly, the legal system may consider whether guidelines are legitimate or not.    
  
Law 
The courts are also concerned that any processes through which guidelines are formulated take 
into account any legal obligations that might apply – a factor that the various meta-guidelines do 
not mention.  In the Eisai cases101 despite the overall praise of NICE’s process, the High Court and 
the Court of Appeal found it to be flawed.102 An argument was advanced in the High Court that 
the guidance was discriminatory as it did not address the issue of atypical groups.  Justice Dobbs 
agreed that NICE had not given any thought to its “present or imminent obligations under anti-
discrimination law”.103  This indicates that one, understandable, element of the court’s decision 
is whether the guideline in question complies with any relevant legal obligations.  This can also 
be seen, albeit less definitively, in the New Zealand case of Shortland v Northland Health104 where 
the Court also implicitly noted, through its reference to the guideline development group’s 
provision of information to the Human Rights Commission, that the group was cognisant of the 
broader legal implications any such guideline might have. 
 
Conclusion 
The legitimacy of clinical guidelines has become an issue.  This in part is due to the proliferation 
of clinical guidelines and uncertainty as to which should be followed.  It is also in part due to 
concerns about the quality of the recommendations set out in the guidelines: whether they are 
based on a systematic analysis of the evidence and whether the guidelines are affected by other 
interests.  As such there has been self-regulation of the clinical guidelines development process 
through the development of meta-guidelines.  Clinical guidelines are also regulated by other 
actors, such as the courts, who play a role in assessing and establishing the legitimacy of 
guidelines.  Generally, the courts do this while they resolve a dispute but in so doing they 
                                                          
100 Johnson and Stricker, n 88. 
101 Eisai Limited v The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence [2007] EWHC 1941 (Admin); Eisai Ltd, R 
(on the application of) v National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) [2008] EWCA Civ 438. 
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Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) [2008] EWCA Civ 438. 
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establish general principles about what process related issues must be attended to for courts to 
uphold specific guidelines as being legitimate in the legal sphere.   
 
The process related concerns of the courts are for the most part broadly congruent with those 
established by the meta-guidelines.  Both recognise that the expertise of the individuals taking 
part in the guidelines process is critical to perceptions of the legitimacy of the guidelines and both 
also recognise that a guideline sanctioned, supported or commissioned by a medical or specialist 
professional body gains legitimacy from the association with that body’s perceived expertise.  As 
Jasanoff notes, science claims legitimacy, in part due to its claim to represent the collective 
agreement of ‘experts’.105  The legal system is also predisposed to examine science to ascertain 
what the consensus is through the use of expert witnesses, although courts recognise that a 
consensus does not have to be unanimous.  A concern is whether the traditional deference of 
the courts to medical opinion and the perception that individual health professionals and 
professional organisations and associations are generally inherently ‘virtuous actors’106 would 
mean that claims to consensus represented by clinical guidelines are not carefully scrutinised, 
which Jasanoff argues would be an abrogation of their normative responsibilities.107  Some courts 
have also acknowledged that while a consensus of experts is important in some context a 
consensus needs to be democratised and include either the involvement of or consultation with 
a broader range of people, including patients, consumer representatives, carer representatives 
and disciplines such as law and bioethics.  This appears particularly the case for national or 
state/province level guidelines, particularly those that touch on access to treatment.  Some 
courts appear to suggest that guidelines that are being developed at the facility level may not 
have the same obligations in terms of collecting and analysing evidence about patient 
experiences, preferences or social needs.  But the courts may consider local guidelines processes 
to have similar process related requirements to national level guidelines processes in respect of 
broad community and stakeholder consultation, at least in respect of guidelines that relate to 
access to treatment, the position in relation to more clinically focused guidelines (i.e. around how 
to respond to a failed intubation108) is less clear.   
 
Central to science’s claims to legitimacy are claims that the scientific process generates evidence 
that can be relied upon.  As such, the methods through which evidence is evaluated to generate 
recommendations for best practice that are valid, robust, systematic, transparent and defensible 
are critically important and is the focus of much attention within meta-guidelines.  Clinical 
guidelines that are informed by so-called ‘junk’ science undermine the legitimacy of other more 
robust guidelines.  The courts are also interested in the quality of the evidence being presented, 
both because it is inherent to the courts’ own claim to be an objective arbitrator of disputes and 
as they too have had problems with ‘junk’ science being used to create poor legal precedents.109 
The cases considered in this paper indicate that the courts will not necessarily accept the 
guideline at face value and may interrogate the process through which the evidence that 
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informed the recommendations in the guidelines was weighed, especially in the context of 
judicial review proceedings.   
 
Concerns that conflicts of interest may affect the perceived legitimacy of guidelines and may have 
very real, often negative, impacts on patients and the health system more generally.  Concerns 
about bias and its impact on decision-making are an important tenet of administrative law and 
thus are likely to be a factor that a court would consider when asked to examine guidelines as 
part of a legal proceeding.    
 
A further factor which will be often be a significant concern for the courts is whether any 
guidelines comply with any relevant legal requirements.  If the formulation of guidelines is 
regarded as a purely technocratic exercise in developing best practice then awareness of the 
possible legal implications of the guidelines may not be high. However, in a context like 
healthcare many guidelines might raise issues of law, ethics or human rights.  The judgements 
considered in this paper suggest that this is particularly the case in respect of guidelines that 
propose to limit access to certain types of health treatments or to withhold or withdraw it.    
However, those who create clinical guidelines should be aware of this important aspect which 
goes towards determining whether the guideline in question will be held by the courts to be 
legitimate.  The perceived legitimacy of clinical guidelines is not only an issue for potential users 
but has broader legal, social and political implications that need to be considered in today’s 
‘pluralistic’ guideline environment. 110     
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